I. Introduction
The evaluation of the performance of investment managers is a much-studied problem in finance. The extensive study of this problem could be justified solely on the basis of the manifest function of these evaluations, which is to aid in the efficient allocation of investment funds among managers. However, an equally important latent function of these evaluations is to provide a method of testing the Efficient Markets Hypothesis.1 If market participants are rational, a necessary condition for superior performance is superior forecasting skills on the part of the performer. Hence, these evaluations can help resolve whether or not the existence of different information among market participants plays an empirically significant role in the formation of equilibrium security prices.
One of the principal applications of modem capital market theory has been to provide a structural specification within which to measure investment performance and thereby to identify * I thank F. Black and J. Cox for many helpful discussions and R. Henriksson for scientific assistance. Aid from the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.
1. Because those who believe that they have superior forecasting skills are reluctant to make public the techniques they use, the evaluation of investment performance is essential for "unbiased" testing on the Efficient Market Hypothesis. Fama (1970) provides an excellent discussion of both the Efficient Markets theory and the various attempts to test it. An equilibrium theory for the value of market-timing skills is derived for the case where there are only two possible predictions: either stocks are predicted to outperforf bonds or bonds are predicted to outperform stocks. It is shown that the pattern of returns from successful market timing has an isomorphic correspondence to the pattern of returns from following certain option investment strategies. This correspondence is used to derive a unique equilibrium price structure of management fees which are independent of investors' preferences, endowments, or prior probability assessments for stock returns. Sufficient statistics for evaluating markettiming skills are derived, and it is shown that the number of correct forecasts is not a useful statistic for this purpose. 363 superior performers if they exist. In this structure, it is usually assumed2 that forecasting skills can be partitioned into two distinct components: (1) forecasts of price movements of selected individual stocks (i.e., "microforecasting"); and (2) forecasts of price movements of the general stock market as a whole (i.e., "macroforecasting"). Usually associated with security analysis, microforecasting involves the identification of individual stocks which are under-or overvalued relative to equities generally. In the context of the well-known Capital Asset Pricing Model specification,3 a microforecaster attempts to identify individual stocks whose expected returns lie significantly above or below the Security Market Line. In his strictest form, the microforecaster would only forecast the nonsystematic or "non-marketexplained" component of the return on individual stocks. For example, suppose that the random variable return per dollar on security j between time t and t + 1, Zj(t), can be described by
Zj(t) = R(t) + Bj[ZM(t) -R(t)] + Ej(t), (1) where Zm(t) is the return per dollar on the market, R(t) is the return per dollar on the riskless asset, and Ej(t) has the property that its expectation conditional on knowing the outcome for ZM(t) is equal to its unconditional expectation, that is, E[E{t) IZM(t)] = E[Ej(t)]. Then a strict microforecast about securityj would be a forecast only about the statistical properties of Ej(t).
Macroforecasting, or "market timing," attempts to identify when equities in general are under-or overvalued relative to the fixed-income securities. A macroforecaster or "market timer," tries to forecast when stocks will outperform bonds-that is, ZM(t) > R(t)-and when bonds will outperform stocks-that is, ZM(t) < R(t). Since a macroforecaster only forecasts the statistical properties of ZM(t) or ZM(t) -R(t), his forecasts can only be used to predict differential performance among individual stocks arising from the systematic, or "marketexplained," components of their returns, {13j[Zm(t) -R(t)] + R(t)}. Of course, both micro-and macroforecasting can be employed to forecast both components of the returns on individual stocks.
Most of the theoretical and empirical research has focused on the performance of portfolio managers who are assumed to be microforecasters (i.e., individual stock pickers).4 However, there are notable exceptions. Using both micro-and macroforecasting, Fama (1972) and Jensen (1972a) examine in detail the theoretical structure of portfolio performance patterns for managers. Jensen also points out the difficulties in identifying empirically the individual contributions of each to overall performance. Grant (1977) derives the effects of market-timing activities on the performance measures employed in the empirical studies which assume microforecasting skills only. Treynor and Mazuy (1966) look for evidence of macroforecasting skills by analyzing return data on mutual funds. Sharpe (1975) simulates the patterns of returns on a portfolio managed by a hypothetically successful market timer. All these studies have in common the fact that they assume a Capital Asset Pricing Model framework.5
A fundamental difference between the model presented here and these earlier models is that I assume that the market timer's forecasts take a very simple form, namely, the market timer forecasts either that stocks will earn a higher return than bonds or that bonds will earn a higher return than stocks. By comparison with the Jensen (1972a) formulation, my model may appear to be less sophisticated because the market timer in the model developed here does not forecast how much better the superior investment will perform. However, when this simple forecast information is combined with a prior distribution for returns on the market, a posterior distribution is derived which does permit probability statements about how much better the superior investment will perform. By formulating the problem in this way, I am able to study market timing without assuming a Capital Asset Pricing Model framework, and therefore, for the most part, my conclusions will be robust with respect to assumptions about the distribution of returns.
My study of market timing is broken into two parts. In the first part, which is presented here, I develop the basic model and analyze the theoretical structure of the pattern of returns from market timing. From this analysis, I derive an equilibrium theory of value for market-timing forecasting skills. In the second part, to be presented in a subsequent paper, I use the structure derived here to develop both parametric and nonparametric statistical procedures to test for superior forecasting skills. These tests of investment performance will distinguish market timing from individual stock selection skills.
The principal findings of the first part can be summarized as follows: The pattern of returns from successful market timing will be shown to have an isomorphic correspondence to the pattern of returns from following certain option investment strategies where the ("implicit") prices paid for options are less than their "fair" or market values. That is, the return patterns from successful market timing will be virtually indistinguishable from the return patterns of these option strategies if 5. Specifically, they assume that stock returns are normally distributed and that relative to the "public" information set, securities are priced so as to satisfy the Security Market Line. the managers of the latter can identify and purchase "undervalued" options.
Using this isomorphic correspondence, we can determine the value of market-timing skills. In making this determination, I begin by analyzing how investors would use the market timer's forecast to modify their probability beliefs about stock returns and, from this analysis, derive both necessary and sufficient conditions for such forecasts to have a positive value. It is shown that the probability of a correct forecast by the market timer is neither a necessary nor a sufficient statistic for determining whether or not his forecasts have positive value. Rather, it is the probability of a correct forecast, conditional upon the return on the market, which serves as such a sufficient statistic.
Under the assumption that the aggregate size of transactions based on the market timer's forecast is small enough to have a negligible effect on market prices, a unique equilibrium price structure of management fees is derived. The derived management fees depend only on the conditional probabilities of a correct forecast and the market prices of options, and therefore, they are independent of investors' preferences, endowments, or prior probability assessments for stock returns. Previous research into the determination of management fees along these lines can be found in Goldman, Sosin, and Gatto (1978) and Goldman, Sosin, and Shepp (1978). However, unlike these earlier analyses, I derive the equilibrium management fees for imperfect market-timing forecasts and obtain my results with no specific assumptions about either the distribution of returns on the market or the way in which option prices are determined.
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section II, I develop the model and derive the equilibrium management fee for the special case where the information set available to all investors (other than the forecaster) is the same and the market timer is a perfect forecaster. Although these assumptions are empirically unrealistic, the analysis of this case provides a useful "benchmark" for interpreting the results derived in the general case. Indeed, the comparative statics propositions proved in this section will apply to the general case. In Section III, the model is developed for the general case where investors may have different information sets, and therefore heterogeneous beliefs about the distribution of returns on the market, and the market timer is an imperfect forecaster. In Section IV, the equilibrium structure of management fees for market timing is derived for this general case.
II. Homogeneous Beliefs and Perfect Forecasting
In this section, I develop the model for the case where there are many investors with homogeneous probability beliefs and a single investor who is a perfect market timer.
At each point in time t, t = 0, 1, 2,... , let +(t) denote the common ("public") information set which is available to all investors. Based upon +(t), investors form a probability assessment for ZM(t), the return per dollar on the market between t and t + 1. Because the public information available to all investors is the same, it is reasonable to assume that the probability density function derived by each investor is the same and let f(Z,t) denote this common density function. It is further assumed that this agreed-upon density function satisfies Rational Expectations in the sense that relative to information set +(t), the (ex post) path of market returns is consistent with the (ex ante) probability beliefs for that path as expressed by f. There is a defaultfree bond whose return per dollar between t and t + 1 is known with certainty as of date t, and we denote the return per dollar on this security by R(t).
In addition to the public information set +(t), one investor has information which he uses to make a market-timing forecast. The nature of this information, when fully exploited, is such that this investor can forecast when stocks will outperform bonds, ZM(t) > R(t), and when bonds will perform at least as well as stocks, ZM(t) -R(t). In this section, it is assumed that his forecast is always correct. Although this forecast is clearly valuable, its direct sale to other investors is difficult because its dissemination cannot be controlled. Hence, to exploit his information edge, it is assumed that the forecaster forms an investment company or mutual fund which he manages in return for fees. The investment policy of the fund is to invest in the market and bonds according to his forecast. As is the case for "real world" investment companies, investors in this fund do not know in advance either the manager's forecast or the positions he has taken. Of course, ex post, they will know both, and whether or not the forecast was accurate, by simply observing the asset returns. It is further assumed that the total assets invested in the fund are small enough so that purchases and sales by the fund have a negligible effect on market prices.
The usual "frictionless" market assumptions, including no taxes and transactions costs, are made throughout the paper. However, for the analysis in this section only, neither borrowing (to buy securities) nor selling short is permitted. Because of the perfect forecast assumption, in the absence of such restrictions the manager would exhibit infinite demands for securities, which is, of course, inconsistent with the price-taker assumption. Since this derived behavior is caused by the crude assumption of perfect forecasting along with the willingness of others to extend unlimited credit, nothing in terms of insights into the real world is lost by imposing these restrictions here. Indeed, most investment company charters prohibit borrowing or selling short, and all limit to some degree the extent to which either can be carried out. Hence, given these restrictions, the manager will follow the strategy of investing all the assets in whichever security dominates the other on the basis of his forecast.6 I formally represent the forecast at time t by the variable y(t), where y(t) = 1 if the forecast is that ZM(t) > R(t) and y(t) = 0 if the forecast is that ZM(t) < R(t). Because f(Z,t) is a rational-expectations density function relative to information set +(t), the probability density for the return on the market conditional on the forecast y(t) = y, ft, can be written as f*(Z,t j}) = (1 -y)f(Z,t)Iq(t),
-Z -R(t)
where (t =RMt q(t) -f f(Z,t)dZ is the probability that the return on the market is less than the return on bonds based upon the public information set +(t). Of course, a necessary condition for equilibrium is that q (t) > 0. Although the analysis is not Bayesian, I borrow its terminology and refer tof(Z,t) as the prior distribution for the market return andf*(Z,t |y) as the posterior distribution. The outside investors in the fund do not know what the forecast will be. Hence, from their perspective, y(t) is a random variable with prob {y(t) = 0} = q(t). The expected value of y(t), E {y(t)}, is equal to 1 -q(t), the unconditional probability that the return on the market will exceed the return on bonds. If A(t) equals the total value of investment in securities by the fund at time t and F(t) equals the total fees paid at the beginning of period t for managing the fund between t and t + 1, then the total (gross) dollar amount invested in the fund at time t, I(t),
satisfies I(t) = A(t) + F(t).
Although the outside investors do not know what the forecast will be, they do know that the forecast will be correct and that the manager will invest all the fund's assets in the market if y(t) = 1 and in bonds if y(t) = 0. Therefore, the random variable end-of-period value of the assets, V(t + 1), as viewed by an outside investor can be written as
V(t + 1) = max [A(t)R(t), A(t)ZM(t)] = A(t)R(t) + max [0,A(t)ZM(t) -A(t)R(t)] (3) = A (t)R (t) + A (t) max [0,ZM(t) -R (t)],
where the distribution function for ZM(t) is given by f(Z,t).
6. The term "dominates" is used here as it is defined in Merton (1973a, p. 143), namely, security A dominates security B if the return on A will exceed the return on B for some possible states of the world and will be at least as large as the return on B in all possible states of the world. Clearly, it is never optimal to invest positive amounts in a dominated security.
For expositional convenience,7 suppose that one "unit" (or "share") in the market portfolio is defined such that the current cost of acquiring one share equals $1. Then, from (3), the end-of-period value of the fund will be identically equal to the end-of-period value of a portfolio which follows the investment strategy of holding $A(t) in bonds and one-period call options on A(t) shares of the market portfolio with exercise price per share of R(t).8 Such an investment strategy is a specific example of a class called "options-bills" or "options-paper" strategies.9
In the absence of management fees, the investment returns from this type of perfect market timing are identical to those that would be earned from the above options-bills strategy (which uses no markettiming information) if the call options could be purchased at a zero price. To see this, note that in the absence of management fees, the initial investment required in the market-timing strategy to generate the end-of-period dollar return in (3) is I(t) = A(t). To generate the same end-of-period dollar return using the options-bills strategy requires an initial investment of $A(t) in bonds plus the cost of acquiring the call options on the market portfolio. Since the dollar return (3) can be achieved using the maket-timing strategy with an initial investment of only $A(t), the economic value of this type of perfect market timing (per dollar of assets held by the fund) is equal to c(t), where c(t) is the market price of a one-period call option on one share of the market portfolio with an exercise price of R(t).
We can rewrite (3) as
V(t + 1) = A(t)ZM(t) + max [O,A(t)R(t) -A(t)ZM(t)] = A (t)ZM(t) + A(t) max [O,R(t) -ZM(t)]. (4)
Inspection of (4) shows that the dollar return on the assets of the fund is also identical to the dollar return on a portfolio which follows the investment strategy of holding A(t) shares (at $1 per share) of the market portfolio and a one-period put option on A(t) shares of the market portfolio with an exercise price per share of R(t).10 Such an investment 7. Therefore, the "end-of-period" value of one share will be ZM(t). At that time, the stock is " split" (or "reverse" split) ZM(t) shares-for-one so that the purchase price of one share is always $1. Of course, ZM(t) includes both dividends and capital gains and no distinction is made between the two throughout the paper.
8. An "American" call option gives its owner the right to purchase a specified number of shares at the exercise price on or before the expiration date. If it is not exercised by that time, it becomes worthless. The call option in the text is "European" and therefore can only be exercised on the expiration date. Moreover, it is also "payout protected" (see Merton 1973a, p. 151) and therefore its value is not affected by the composition of the market's return between dividends and capital gains.
9. For a description and analysis of these strategies, see Merton, Scoles, and Gladstein (1978).
10. An "American" put option gives its owner the right to sell a specified number of shares at the exercise price on or before the expiration date. As for the call option discussed in n. 8, the put option in the text is European and payout protected. strategy is an example of a "protective put" or "insured equity" strategy. "I As with the options-bills strategy, to achieve the end-of-period dollar return (4) using the protective put strategy (with no market-timing information) requires an initial investment of $A(t) in the market portfolio plus $A(t)g(t) in put options where g(t) is the market price of a one-period put option on one share with an exercise price of R(t). Hence, the economic value of this type of perfect market timing (per dollar of assets held by the fund) is also equal to g (t). However, there is no inconsistency in using either the call or put isomorphic relationship to determine the economic value of the information because c(t) = g (t) by the well-known Parity Theorem.'2 (Note that the market prices of the options are the equilibrium prices based upon the public information f[t].) 13 As has been discussed elsewhere, 14 the put option as an instrument is very much analogous to a term insurance policy where the item insured is the value of the underlying stock and the maximum coverage (or "face value") of the policy is the exercise price. Through the derived correspondence of the market-timing strategy with the protective put strategy, we therefore have that the principal benefit of market timing is to provide insurance. The investor who follows the uninformed strategy of always holding the market suffers the capital losses as well as enjoying the gains from market movements. However, the successful market timer earns the gains but is "insured" against the losses.
From ( 
11. For a description and analysis of these strategies, see Merton, Scholes, and Gladstein (in press).
12. If borrowing and lending interest rates are equal, then for payout-protected European options on the same stock with the same exercise price and expiration dates, g(t) = c(t) -S + EIR(t) where S is the current stock price and E is the exercise price. In the case in the text, S = 1 and E = R(t), and so, g(t) = c(t). For a proof and discussion of the Parity Theorem, see Merton (1973a, p. 157, theorem 12; 1973b).
13. As was assumed for stocks and bonds in the text, I assume that the market timer's actions have no effect on option prices. Of course, based upon his information set (with no borrowing or selling short), the call option would be worthless if y(t) = 0 and the put option would be worthless if y(t) = 1.
14. See Merton et al. (1978, pp. 185-88) .
where m(t) F(t)IA(t) is the management fee expressed as a fraction of assets held by the fund. If, as is reasonable to assume, investors behave competitively, then the equilibrium management fee will be such that the market timer extracts all the economic benefit from his differential information. As was shown, the economic value of his forecast per dollar of invested assets is equal to g(t). Therefore, the equilibrium management fee as a fraction of invested assets will satisfy m(t) = g(t)
= c(t).
Expressed as a percentage of gross investment, the fee is given by
Another way to see that (7) is the correct equilibrium management fee is as follows: In equilibrium, the cost to the investor for receiving a specified pattern of returns should be the same independent of the manner in which that pattern is created. From the viewpoint of the investor, the fund is a "black box" in the sense that all he can observe is the pattern of returns generated by the fund. He does not observe the forecasts or the resulting transactions made by the manager to create that pattern. So, for example, a manager with no forecasting skills could guarantee the dollar return V(t + 1) given in (4) by simply investing $A(t) in the market and $A(t)g(t) in put options on the market with exercise price per share of R(t). Viewed as a black box, the dollar returns to this manager's fund would be identical to the dollar returns from the market timer's fund. Of course, the cost to the former of achieving this dollar return would be A(t) + A(t)g(t) = [1 + g(t)]A (t).
Equating this cost to the cost of the latter, we have that [1 + g (t) ]A(t) = [1 + m(t)]A(t) or m(t) = g(t). At this fee, the investor would be just indifferent between investing in either of the two funds. Since the investor can always choose to follow this protective put strategy, I have also shown that the management fee given in (7) is the maximum fee which the market timer can receive.
If the environment were such that investors in the fund had some market power, then they could bargain away from the manager some of the economic value of the forecast, and the management fee would be less than g(t). In this case, the returns earned by investors in the fund would be identical to those earned by following a protective put strategy using no market timing where the investors can identify and purchase "undervalued" puts. Specifically, if X is defined such that m(t) = Xg(t)(O < X -1), then the returns earned by the investors would be "as if" they could purchase puts at 100(1 -X)% less than their "fair" value. From (7), one could in principle use observed put-and call-option prices to estimate the value of macroforecasting skill. Moreover, this correspondence permits the direct application of the extensive results derived in option pricing theoryt5 to a comparative statics analysis of equilibrium management fees. From such an analysis, the following propositions can be established. PROPOSITION 11.1: The management fee is a nondecreasing function of the riskiness (volatility) of the market portfolio.
In Merton (1973a, p. 149, theorem 8), it is shown that a call option's price is a nondecreasing function of the riskiness of its underlying stock where the definition of "more risky" is that of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) . 16 The proof of the proposition follows directly from (7) because m(t) = c(t). Thus, the more uncertain investors are about the outcomes for the market, the more valuable is the market timer's forecast.
In the analysis, the forecasts are made at discrete points in time (t = 0, 1, 2, . . .). Let r denote the actual length of time between forecasts in some fixed time unit such as "one day." So, for example, if the market timer's forecast is for a month, then r = 30 (days). In his forecast is for a quarter, then r = 91 (days). The percentage management fee per forecast period is m(t). [4]), it is shown that a call option is a nondecreasing function of its length of time until expiration. Proposition 11.2 follows directly. Hence, the management fee for 1 month for a manager making 1-month forecasts is at least as large as the management fee for 1 week for a manager making 1-week forecasts. However, this does not imply that the services provided by the manager who makes 1-month forecasts are more valuable than the services provided by the manager who makes 1-week forecasts. Indeed, as the proof of the following proposition demonstrates, quite the opposite is true. Hence, for all possible outcomes, X1 > X2, and for some possible outcomes, X1 > X2. Therefore, all investors would be willing to pay at least as large a (and generally, larger) management fee (per time interval r) for the first fund as they would for the second fund. The most widely used formula for evaluating options was developed in a seminal paper by Black and Scholes (1973) . Under the twin assumptions that trading takes place continuously and that the underlying stock returns follow a continuous sample path diffusion process with a constant variance rate, they use an arbitrage argument to deduce a formula for a call option given by17 f(S, T, E) = SD(x) -Ee -rT(X2), the conditions that trading takes place continuously in time and that the rate of return on the market portfolio follows a diffusion process with a variance rate which is constant over (at least) the forecast interval, the equilibrium management fee can be written as 2), part 2 of proposition 11.4 is just a special case of proposition 11.1. Part 3 of proposition 11.4 conflicts with the usual comparative static result that the price of a call option is an increasing function of the interest rate. 18 The reason for the difference is that the exercise price of the call option corresponding to the management fee is an increasing function of the interest rate, whereas in the usual comparative static analysis the exercise price is held fixed. Because the price of a call option is a decreasing function of its exercise price, the positive relationship between the exercise price and the interest rate brings in an 17. This formula applies for a payout-protected European call option which is exactly appropriate for the purposes of the text.
18. See Merton (1973a, pp. 145-46, and theorem 14, p. 167).
offsetting negative effect on value in this case. While I have only shown that the management fee is independent of the interest rate in the special case when Black-Scholes applies, I conjecture that this result will obtain under more general conditions. The basis for this conjecture is that, unlike the call option, the price of a put option is usually believed to be a decreasing function of the interest rate. However, as I have shown, the management fee can also be expressed in terms of a put option's price. Since, whether expressed as a put or a call, the effect of a change in the interest rate on the management fee must be the same, I am led to the belief that it will be independent of the interest rate. Formula (10) can also be used for the management fee to provide a quantitative example of proposition 11.3. Suppose the variance rate for the market returns is a constant (r2. Then, from (10), the percentage management fee (per forecast interval) will be the same each period. Let mn denote the percentage management fee for a fixed time period T where n is the number of forecast periods contained in that fixed time period. That is, the forecast interval r equals Tin. Because in this case the management fee per forecast period is the same each period, we have from (10) To further develop the return characteristics associated with market timing, I shall return to my earlier analysis and compare the pattern of returns from the perfect market-timing strategy with the patterns generated by the "no-information" option strategies used to derive the equilibrium management fee. If the return per dollar from a protective put strategy with no forecasting information is denoted by Y(t), then
where X(t) is the return per dollar from perfect market timing given in (5). The difference in the expected return because the two strategies can be written as (13), the differences in the expected rates of return will be quite significant. In the examples given, the perfect forcasting strategy for an annual forecast will have an expected rate of return of 24%, which is a 60% increase over the 15% for the protective put strategy. For a monthly forecast, the monthly expected rate of return will be 2.4%, which is twice the 1.2% return expected for the protective put. While the significantly higher expected return from the perfect timing strategy is probably no surprise, the relative characteristics of the higher moments of the two return distributions may be. If Mn(Z) denotes the nth central moment of the random variable Z, then, from (12),
E[X(t)] -E[Y(t)] = g(t)E[Y(t)]

Mnt Y(t)] = Mn1[X(t)]I[1 + g(t)]n. (14)
Thus, all the higher moments of the perfect timing strategy returns are larger than the corresponding moments of the protective put strategy. Hence, while one might have believed that the perfect market-timing information would result in a significantly smaller standard deviation of return than the "no-information" protective put strategy, it does not, and, in fact, its standard deviation is higher.20 However, to a close approximation, the standard deviations of the two strategies will be the same. 20. Note that this higher standard deviation is fundamental in the sense that there is no other strategy that the market timer could pursue which would lower the standard deviation and not be suboptimal. For example, to reduce his standard deviation by always holding some portion in the riskless security would mean that at those times when y(t) = 1 he would be holding positive amounts of a dominated security which is never optimal.
21. The put option premiums used in this simulation were computed using formula (10) with o-(t) estimated for each month by the square root of the average of the squared logarithmic returns on the market for the 12 previous months. The return data include dividends. The reader may find it interesting to compare my perfect timing returns with those reported in Sharpe (1975) . * These returns also represent the simulated return experience of the market timer's fund after deducting the monthly management fee. This monthly management fee, which is equal to the 1-month put price, averaged 2.02% for the simulation period. However, within this period the fee often varied significantly from this average. The lowest monthly fee was 0.67% and the highest was 7.63%, with an overall standard deviation of 1.20%. The large variations in the put price through time caused the time series estimates of the standard deviation and coefficient of skewness for the protective put strategy to differ from the corresponding estimates for the market-timing strategy by more than the singleperiod amounts derived in the text.
The preceding analysis was made under the assumption that borrowing to buy securities and selling short are not allowed. Of course, in the real world, such margin transactions are permitted, although there are limits which are set by the Federal Reserve Board under Regulation T. Although the equilibrium management fee will be affected by the margin limits, the basic analysis remains unchanged as long as there are limits.
Let ,u(o < A -1) denote the margin requirement set by the Federal Reserve. Then, investors may borrow to buy securities up to A times the value of the securities purchased. So, for example, if A = 0.50 (a "50%" margin requirement), then for each dollar of securities purchased, the investor can borrow 50 cents. Equivalently, for each dollar the investor provides, he can purchase up to $(1/,), or $2.00 worth of securities.
The same margin requirement A also establishes the amount of assurance money that must be posted as collateral for short sales. For each dollar of securities sold short, the investor must put up $, in addition to the proceeds from the short sale. If A = 0.50, then for each dollar sold short, the investor must post 50 cents in addition to the dollar received from the sale. So, for each dollar the investor provides, he can sell short $(1/,), or $2.00 worth of securities.
Both institutions and individual investors are subject to the same margin regulations. However, as noted earlier, investment companies are frequently subject to further restrictions on borrowing and short selling. To take this into account in the analysis, let A' denote the margin restriction on the fund where ,' > ,. Otherwise we maintain the usual "frictionless" market assumptions that the (margin) borrowing rate to both individual investors and the fund are the same and equal to the lending rate and that the interest earned on assurance money and proceeds of short sales accrues to the short seller. PROPOSITION 11.5: If the fund is permitted to borrow to buy securities with a margin requirement ,' but is prohibited from making short sales, then the equilibrium percentage management fee (per forecast interval) is given by m(t) = c(t)l,' = g(t)l,u'.
The proof of proposition 11.5 goes as follows: If the market timer's forecast is that ZM(t) > R(t), then, of course, the manager will invest as much of the fund's assets in the market as he is permitted to. Hence, for ZM(t) > R(t), the return per dollar of assets in the fund will beR(t) +
[ZM(t) -R(t)]I,'. If his forecast is that ZM(t) -R(t), then because he
cannot sell short, he will invest all the fund's assets in the riskless bond and the return per dollar of assets in the fund will be R(t). Therefore, from the viewpoint of the outside investors, the random variable return per dollar of assets in the fund can be written as
X(t) = max [R(t),R(t) + [ZM(t) -R(t)]I/'] = R(t) + max [O,ZM(t) -R(t)]/,u'. (15)
Therefore, if the management fee is m(t), the return per dollar to the outside investor's portfolio, Zp(t), can be written as
Zp(t) = X(t)I[1 + m(t)] = {R(t)+ max [O,ZM(t) -R(t)]I,u'}I[1 + m(t)]. (16)
Consider the option-bills strategy where, for each dollar invested in the riskless asset, (ll,') call options on the market with exercise price per share R(t) are purchased. The return per dollar from this strategy will
be{R(t) +max[O,ZM(t) -R(t)]/,'}I[1 +c(t)/,'],where,asbefore,c(t)
is the market price of the call option. By inspection of (16), the return per dollar to the investor in the absence of management fees will be identical to the return on this options-bills strategy where the investor pays nothing for the calls. Hence, by the same arguments used to derive (7), the equilibrium management fee (as a percentage of assets)
will equal c(t)l,'. As was shown earlier, c(t) = g(t). Hence, the management fee can also be expressed as g(t)l,'. Of course, if the margin requirement is 100%, then , = = 1 and the management fee reduces to c(t) as given in (7). PROPOSITION 11.6: If the fund is permitted to both borrow to buy securities and make short sales with a margin requirement ,', then the
equilibrium percentage management fee (per forecast interval) is given by m(t) = [c(t) + g(t)]l,l' = 2c(t)l,' = 2g(t)I'!.
The proof of proposition 11.6 follows along the lines of the previous proof. As before, if the manager's forecast is that ZM(t) > R(t), then the return per dollar of assets in the fund will be R(t) + [ZM(t) -R(t)]I/'. However, now if his forecast is that ZM(t) -R(t), the manager will short sell the market to the maximum permitted and the return per dollar will therefore be R(t) + [R(t) -ZM(t)]I,A'. From the viewpoint of an outside investor, the return per dollar of assets in the fund is given by
X(t) = max {R(t) + [ZM(t) -R(1)]/,', R(t) + [R(t) -ZM(t)]1t'} = R(t) + {max [O,ZM(t) -R(t)] + (17) max [O,R(t) -ZM(t)]}/L'.
Hence, if the management fee is m(t), the return per dollar to the outside investor's portfolio can be written as p(t) = [R(t) + {max [O,ZM(t) -R(t)] + max [O,R(t) -ZM(t)]}II'1/[l + m(t)]. (18)
A straddle is a put and a call with the same exercise price and expiration date. Consider the "straddle-bills" strategy where, for each dollar invested in the riskless asset, (ll,'), straddles on the market with exercise price per share R(t) are purchased. Since the market price of a straddle equals c(t) + g(t), the return per dollar from this strategy equalsX(t)/{1 + [c(t) + g(t)]I'}. Hence, by the same arguments used to derive (7), the equilibrium management fee (as a percentage of assets) will equal [c(t) + g(t)]l,'. Noting that c(t) = g(t), the proof of proposition 11.6 is complete. In summary, we have shown that the returns to a portfolio employing perfect market timing are identical to the returns from following certain option-investment strategies. From this isomorphic relationship, the equilibrium management fees (and, hence, the value of such macroforecasting skills) were determined in terms of the market prices for options. Of course, the assumption that such perfect market-timing forecasts can be made is totally unrealistic. Hence, beginning in the next section, I shall examine the more interesting case where the market timer's forecast can be wrong. However, the analysis of this section will be helpful in providing insights into the more realistic but also more complicated analysis of imperfect macroforecasting.
III. Heterogeneous Beliefs and Imperfect Forecasting
In this section, I shall generalize the model of the previous section by allowing for the possibility that investors have different information sets and that the market timer's forecast may be wrong. At each point in time t, let 4j(t) denote the jth information set, j = 1, 2, . . . , N.
Without loss of generality, we can associate a particular investor with each information set so that investorj forms his probability assessment for the return per dollar on the market between t and t + 1 based upon 4j(t). Letf3(Z,t) denote the probability density function for the return per dollar on the market based upon 4j(t). It is assumed that forj = 1, 2, . . ., N, fj satisfies Rational Expectations relative to information set 4j in the sense that the (ex post) path of market returns is consistent with the (ex ante) density fj. Let qj(t) denote the probability, based upon 4j(t), that the return on the market between t and t + 1 will be less than or equal to the return per dollar on the riskless asset, R(t). Then rRMt qj(t) -f fj(Z,t)dZ.
It is further assumed that, forj = 1, 2, . . . , N, 0 < qj(t) < 1, and so, for every information set, the return on the market is uncertain and the market neither dominates nor is dominated by the riskless asset. As in Section II, there is a market timer who forecasts when stocks will outperform bonds, ZM(t) > R(t), and when bonds will perform at least as well as stocks, ZM(t) -R(t). Unlike in Section II, the market timer's forecast may be wrong. Let 0(t) be a random variable such that 0(t) = 1 if the forecast is correct and 0(t) = 0 if the forecast is incorrect. Of course, to evaluate the forecast, investors must have some information about the distribution of 0(t). The information made available to investors will depend upon the information set of the forecaster and his concern with protecting that information as well as the information available to investors from other sources.
For example, one might assume that the forecaster provides the complete joint probability distribution, Having ruled out that the forecaster will provide the complete joint probability distribution, we are left to choose between the two conditional probability distributions 
p[A(t),O(t)], where A(t) is a random variable such that A(t) = 1 if ZM(t) > R(t) and A(t) = 0 if ZM(t) S R(t). However, this assumption implies that the forecaster has an unconditional or prior distribution for A(t), given byp [A(t)] = p [A(t),0]
By not havingpl(t) orp2(t) in (20) depend uponj, I am assuming that all investors, independent of their information sets, agree on these conmination. In this section, I derive the equilibrium value of such foredo take into account the possibility that the accuracy of the forecast may not be independent of the return on the market. Thus, statements such as, "He is a better forecaster in up-markets than he is in downmarkets," can be given precise and quantitative meaning in this model. Such a forecaster would be characterized as making forecasts such that p l(t) < P2(t). However, in keeping with the hypothesized structure of the information available to the forecaster, p (t) and p 2(t) are themselves assumed to be independent of Z. Therefore, while the probability of a correct forecast may depend upon whether or not the return on the market exceeds the return on bonds, it does not otherwise depend upon the magnitude of the market's return.
If, as in the previous analysis, y(t) = 1 if the forecast at time t is ZM(t) > R(t) and y(t) = 0 if the forecast is that ZM(t) -R(t), then from (20), the probabilities for y(t) conditional upon the realized return on the market can be written as prob {y(t) = 0 ZM(t) < R(t)} = p l(t) (21a) prob {y(t) = 1 ZM(t) S R(t)} = 1-p l(t) and prob {y(t) = 0 ZM(t) > R(t)} = 1 -p2(t) prob {y(t) = 1 ZM(t) > R(t)} = P2(t)-(21b) Therefore, based upon information set j, we have from (19) and (20) that, from the viewpoint of investorj, the unconditional probability of a correct forecast by the market timer, p'(t), can be written as pi(t) prob {0(t) = 1 I j(t)} = qj(t)pl(t) + [1 -qj(t)]p2(t).
Note from (22) that, in general, the probability of a correct forecast will depend on the investor's information set, and only in the special case when the accuracy of the forecast is independent of the return on the market-that is, p l(t) = p 2(t) p (t)-is the probability of a correct forecast, pi(t) = p (t), independent of j.
From ( As in Section II, I callfj(Z, t) the prior distribution of the return on the market for investorj. Based upon this prior, we define the posterior distribution for investorj, f*(Z, t I y), to be the probability density for the return on the market conditional upon the forecast y(t) = y. Under the hypothesized information structure, we have from (23) thatf* can be written as 
for R(t)<Z < oo.
The distribution that investorj would use if, in addition to j(t), he had the market timer's forecast isf>*. Of course, it will be the differences betweenfj andfj* which will account for investorj's willingness to pay for the forecast information. The distribution used by the market timer for his personal investment decisions if the information available to him, other than his forecast, were information set j(t) would also be represented by ft. Note that for perfectly correct forecasts-that is, p l(t) = p 2(t) = 1-(24) simply reduces to (2) in Section II. Because the value of the market timer's forecasts will depend upon how those forecasts modify investors' prior distributions, I shall now analyze in detail the differences between the prior and posterior distributions.
While to this point, no restrictions have been imposed upon the conditional probabilities p l(t) and p 2(t), it seems reasonable to require that they be such that the forecasts are rational. A forecast is said to be rational if, given the forecast, no investor would modify his prior in the opposite direction of the forecast. Specifically, investorj's priors are that bonds will outperform stocks with probability qj(t) and that stocks will outperform bonds with probability 1 -qj(t). After receiving the market timer's forecast y(t) = y, investorj's revised probabilities for the two events will be q*(t ;y) and 1 -q:*(t;y), respectively, where rRMt qj*(t;y)-f(f*(z,t y)dZ.
Therefore, the forecasts will be rational if, for every investorj, ql*(t; 0) ? qj(t) and q*(t; 1) S qj(t).
PROPOSITION 111.1L: A necessary and sufficient condition for a market timer's forecasts to be rational is that p 1(t) + p 2(t) ? 1.
The proof is as follows: From (24), q*(t; 0) -qj(t) if and only if p l(t) 6j(t), and ql*(t; 1) -qj(t) if and only if p l(t) -6j(t). So, a necessary and sufficient condition for the forecasts to be rational is that p l(t) M 63(t) for everyj. From (23), p l(t) -6j(t) if and only if [1 -qj(t)]p l(t) > [1 -qj(t)][ I -p2(t)]
. But, 0 <qj(t) < 1 for all information sets 4j(t),j = 1, 2, ... . N. Hence, p 1 : 6j(t) if and only if p l(t) + P 2(t) ? 1. However, the condition that p l(t) + p 2(t) ? 1 is independent ofj and is therefore a ncessary and sufficient condition for all j's.
An immediate corollary to proposition 111.1 is that if a forecast is irrational (i.e., not rational) then, given the forecast, every investor would modify his prior in the opposite direction of the forecast. One should not infer that an irrational forecast has no value. A forecaster who is always wrong is as valuable as one who is always right provided that this "bias" is known by those acting on the forecast. Indeed, the opposite or contrary forecast to an irrational forecast is always rational. To see this, note that the contrary forecast's conditional probabilities of success satisfy p '(t) = 1 -p l(t) and p 2(t) = 1 -p 2(t). So, if p l(t) + p2(t) < 1, then pl(t) + p'(t) > 1. Hence, with no loss of generality, it is assumed throughout the rest of the analysis that forecasts are rational and therefore that p l(t) + p 2(t) > 1.
As mentioned earlier, for the market timer's forecast to be of value to investorj, it must provide information which would modify his prior distribution for the return on the market. Therefore, iff* = fj, then the market timer's forecast will have no value to investor j. PROPOSITION 111.2: If the conditional probabilities for a correct forecast given in (20) are such thatp l(t) + p 2(t) = 1, then the market timer's forecast will have no value to any investor and hence the value of the forecast information is zero.
The proof of proposition 111.2 is as follows: Ifp l(t) + p 2(t) = 1, then by substitution in (23), we have that 6j(t) = p l(t) = 1 -p 2(t) and that 1 -8A(t) = 1 -p l(t) = p 2(t). Moreover, this value of 6j(t) is the same for every investorj (j = 1, . . . , N) . Substituting for 6j(t) in (24), we have that f*(Z, t I y) = fj(Z, t) for every value of y and for all j. Thus, independent of the forecast given, each investor's posterior distribution will be equal to his prior distribution. Therefore, forp l(t) + p 2(t) = 1, the market timer's forecast will have no value to any investor and the value of the forecast information is zero. PROPOSITION 
111.3: A necessary condition for a rational forecast to have a positive value is that the conditional probabilities given in (20) satisfy p l(t) + P 2(t) > 1.
The proof follows immediately from proposition 111. 1 and proposition 111.2. While it has only been shown thatp1(t) + p2(t) > 1 is a necessary condition for a rational forecast to have positive value, it is also a sufficient condition, as will be shown later in Section IV. Indeed, the larger is p l(t) + p 2(t), the more valuable is the forecast information. Proposition 111.2 can also be used to confirm the common-sense result that if the market timer's forecasts are random, then the value of such forecasts is zero. PROPOSITION 
III.4: If the forecast variable is distributed independent of the return on the market, then the value of the forecast is zero. By hypothesis, y(t) is distributed independent of ZM(t). Therefore, p l(t) -prob {y(t) = 0 | ZM(t) S R(t)} = prob {y(t) = 0 | ZM(t) > R(t)}
1 -p2(t). Hence, p1(t) + p2(t) = 1, and, by proposition 111.2, the forecast has zero value.
So, if forecasts are formed by simply flipping a (not necessarily fair) coin where -q is the probability that the forecast will be -y(t) = 0 and 1 --q is the probability that the forecast will be -y(t) = 1, then p l(t) = -q and p2(t) = 1 --q, and therefore such forecasts will have zero value.
Included as a special case of this type of forecast is to always forecast that ZM(t) -R(t)-that is, y(t) = 0, p l(t) = -q = 1, and p 2(t) = 0-or to always forecast that ZM(t) > R(t)-that is, y(t) = 1, p l(t) = = 0, and
p 2(t) = 1. Like a stopped clock, such a forecast will sometimes be correct, but it never has any value.
Having established that completely random forecasts have zero value, I shall now go to the other extreme and show that completely predictable forecasts also have zero value. PROPOSITION 111.5: If the forecast variable is itself perfectly forecastable by investorj, then the value of the forecast to investorj is zero.
Suppose investor j uses his information set fj to predict the market timer's forecast, y(t). Let yj(t) denote this forecast. By hypothesis, investor j's prediction is always correct-that is, ryj(t) = -y(t)-and therefore,p1(t) =prob {y(t) = 0 | ZM(t) -R(t)} = 1 -yj(t) andp2(t) = prob {y(t) = 1 I ZM(t) >R(t)} = yj(t). Hence,p1(t) +p2(t) = 1 and, by proposition 111.2, the value of the forecast is zero.
Like proposition 111.4, proposition 111.5 is a commonsense result. If investorj can always predict the market timer's forecast, then all the information used by the market timer must be contained in fj. Since all the information in fj relevant to the return on the market is captured by fj, investorj should neither revise his prior in response to the market timer's forecast nor pay for the forecast.
In (20), I assumed that p l(t) and p 2(t) were the same for all investors. Hence, the hypothesized conditions of proposition 111.5 will not be consistent with (20) unless all investors can perfectly forecast y(t).
These conditions would be consistent with a more general model where the conditional probabilities p l(t) and p 2(t) are different for different investors. Since the effect of such a generalization on all the results obtained is discussed at the end of this section, I shall say no more here except to point out one important case where the conditions of proposition 111.5 and (20) are consistent. As in Section II, let +(t) denote the set of information available to all investors (i.e., the "public information set"). and therefore, 4(t)E4j. By hypothesis, the market timer's forecasts are based solely on information contained in +(t). Hence, each investor] can use +(t), which is contained in 4j, to predict correctly the market timer's forecast y(t). Therefore, by proposition 111.5, the value of the forecast to each investor is zero.
The conclusions of propositions 111.4, 111.5, and 111.6 that investors will not pay for random forecasts or for forecasts based upon informa-tion they already have are hardly counterintuitive. Indeed, because any sensible model should produce these results, proof of these propositions serves as a check on the validity of the model presented here. However, the model does produce other results which may not be so intuitive. For example, the following three propositions point out the "pitfalls" in relying on the probability of a correct forecast as even a qualitative measure of the value of a forecast. PROPOSITION 
111.7:
The unconditional probability of a correct forecast, pi(t), being greater than .5 is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the forecast to have a positive value.
To prove that it is not necessary, it is merely necessary to show that it is possible forp l(t) + p 2(t) > 1 and forp'(t) -0.5. Suppose that qj(t) = 0.7, p1(t) = 0.4, andp2(t) = 0.7; p1(t) + p2(t) = 1.1 > 1 and, from (22), pi(t) = 0.49 -0.5. To prove that it is not sufficient, it can be shown that it is possible forp l(t) + p 2(t) = 1 and forp'(t) > 0.5. Suppose that qj(t) = 0.7 and a "stopped clock" forecast where pl(t) = 1 and p2(t) = 0. Then, pl(t) + p2(t) = 1 and, from (22), p'(t) = qj(t) = 0.7 > 0.5. Letpi(t) denote the unconditional probability of a correct forecast by market timer I from the viewpoint of investor j and let pi (t) be the corresponding probability of a correct forecast by market timer II. PROPOSITION 111.8: pi(t) > p1i(t) is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the forecast by market timer I to be more valuable than the forecast by market timer II.
To prove that it is not necessary, I show that it is possible for pi(t) <pI(t); pI(t) + pI(t) > 1; and pII(t) + pII(t) = 1. As in the proof of proposition 111.7, suppose that qj(t) = .7;pI(t) = 0.4;pI(t) = 0.7;pII(t) = 1;p 2I(t) = 0. Then, p (t) = 0.49 < p j(t) = 0.7, butpI(t) + pI(t) = 1.1 > pII(t) + pII(t) = 1. To prove that it is not sufficient, one need only interchange I with II in the proof that it is not necessary.
Suppose that investorj makes his own forecast based upon his prior probability assessment for the return on the marketfj. If yj(t) denotes investorj's forecast variable, then his forecast will be yj(t) = 0 when qj(t) > 1 -qj(t) and yj(t) = 1 when qj(t) < 1 -qj(t). From the viewpoint of that investor, the unconditional probability of his own forecast being correct is equal to max [qj(t), 1 -qj(t)]. PROPOSITION 111.9: pj(t) : max [qj(t), 1 -qj(t)] is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the market timer's forecast to have zero value.
Necessity can be proven by showing that pi(t) > max [qj(t), 1 -qj(t)] implies that p l(t) + p 2(t) > 1. From (22), p l(t)qj(t) + p 2(t) [ -qj(t)] > max [qj(t), 1 -qj(t)]. Therefore, [p l(t) + p2(t)] max [qj(t), 1-qj(t)] > max [qj(t), 1 -qj(t)]
. Hence, p l(t) + P 2(t) > 1. To prove that it is not a sufficient condition, we simply show that it is possible for p3(t) < max [qj(t), 1 -qj(t)] and for p l(t) + p 2(t) > 1. As in the previous proofs, suppose that qj(t) = 0.7, p l(t) = 0.4, andp2(t) = 0.7. Then, pi(t) = 0.49 < max [qj(t), 1 -qj(t)] = 0.7 and pl(t) + p2(t) = 1.1 > 1.
Thus, even if the probability of a correct forecast by the market timer is less than the probability of a correct forecast by investorj using only his prior, one cannot conclude that the value of the market timer's forecast to investorj is zero.
As propositions 111.7, 111.8, and 111.9 amply demonstrate, the frequency with which the market timer's forecasts are correct is in general a very poor statistic for evaluating the forecasts, and this is the case even when investors' beliefs are homogeneous. Using propositions 111.2 and 111.3, one might summarize by saying, "It is not so much how often the market timer is correct, but when he is correct that determines the value of his forecasts." However, there is one special case when the probability of a correct forecast is a sufficient statistic for value. PROPOSITION 111. 10: If the probability of a correct forecast is independent of the return on the market, then p3(t) = 0.5 is a necessary and sufficient condition for the forecast to have zero value.
By hypothesis, we have from (20) that p l(t) = p 2(t) p (t). Substituting into (22)
, we have that pi(t) = p(t), independent ofj. Therefore, pi(t) = 0.5 implies that p1(t) + p2(t) = 2p(t) = 1. Hence, by proposition 111.2, the forecast has zero value. Under the hypothesized condition, pi(t) < 0.5 implies that 2p (t) = p1(t) + p2(t) < 1 and therefore that the forecast is irrational by proposition 111. 1. However, as discussed earlier, such a forecast has positive value because the contrary forecast which is rational will satisfy p (t) + p2(t) > 1. Under the hypothesized condition, pi(t) > 0.5 implies that 2p (t) = p l(t) + p 2(t) > 1 and therefore that the forecast has positive value.
Although the probability of a correct forecast is not a reliable indicator of the value of a forecast, it can be used to determine the conditions under which investorj will "agree" with the market timer's forecast. Investorj is said "to agree with the market timer's forecast" if, having received the market timer's forecast, investorj's own forecast based upon his posterior probability assessment is the same as the market timer's forecast.
It follows immediately from proposition III.11 that investor] will always agree with the market timer's forecast if and only if pj(t) : max [qj(t), 1 -qj(t)]. It also follows that investorj will always disagree with the market timer's forecast only if p3(t) < min [qj(t), 1 -qj(t)]
. However, this possibility is not consistent with the market timer's forecast being rational. PROPOSITION 111.12: If investorj always disagrees with the market timer's forecast, then the market timer's is irrational and investorj would always agree with the contrary forecast.
From (22), p'(t) < min [qj(t), 1 -qj(t)] if and only if p l(t) + p 2(t) < 1.
Hence, from proposition 111. 1, the market timer's forecast is irrational. The unconditional probability of the contrary forecast being correct is 1 -pi(t). But p3(t) < min [qj(t), 1 -qj(t)] implies that 1 -pi(t) > max [qj(t), 1 -qj(t)]. Therefore, by proposition 111.1, investorj would always agree with the contrary forecast.
In summary, the behavior of investorj toward rational forecasts is to always agree with the market timer's forecast if the unconditional probability of a correct forecast by the market timer is at least as large as the probability of a correct forecast by investor j using his prior distribution. If this condition is not satisfied, then the posterior forecast of investorj, -yj*(t), will always agree with his own prior forecast, yj(t).
Because the agreement of investor j's posterior forecast with the market timer's forecast depends only upon the conditional probability of a correct forecast, it is clear from propositions 111.7, 111.8, and 111.9 that disagreement does not imply that investorj should disregard the market timer's forecast. And such disagreement certainly does not imply that the market timer's forecast is irrational. Indeed, if one were to define a "rational forecast" as one where every investor's posterior forecast agrees with the market timer's forecast, then virtually the only forecast to satisfy this definition would be one that is always correct, that is, pQ(t) = p2(t) = 1. To see this, note that such a "rational" forecast must satisfy both p 1(t)/[I -p 2(t)] ? m4x {[I1 -qj(t)]/qj(t)} and P 2(t)1 -p 1(t)] > max {qj(t)/[1 -qj(t)]}. Hence, with this definition for a rational forecast, virtually all forecasts (including valuable ones) would be "irrational."
To further underscore the difference between "agreement" and "rationality" (as I define it), consider a forecast with p l(t) + p 2(t) > 1 and with an unconditional probability of being correct, pi(t), which is less than 0.5 for every investorj. From proposition 111.7, it is possible for a forecast to have both these properties. Because p'(t) < 0.5 -max [qj(t), 1 -qj(t)] for every investorj, no investor will always agree with the market timer's forecast. Yet, from proposition 111. 1, this forecast is rational, and indeed, because p l(t) + p 2(t) > 1, it has a positive value. Propositions 111.7, 111.8, and 111.9 made apparent the pitfalls in using the unconditional probability of a correct forecast as an indicator of the forecast's value. This example shows that it is not a reliable indicator of when a forecast is rational. The contrary forecast to the market timer's forecast has an unconditional probability of being correct equal to 1 -pi(t), and in this example all investors would agree that 1 -pi(t) > 0.5. However, this contrary forecast is irrational because p l(t) + P2(t) > 1 implies that p'1(t) + pQ(t) 1 -P1(t) + 1 -P 2(t) < 1.
To 
IV. Equilibrium Management Fees and the Value of Market Timing
In the last section, the conditions were established under which a market timer's forecast would or would not have a positive value. It was shown there that the conditional probabilities of a correct forecast, p l(t) and p 2(t), were sufficient statistics to make that qualitative determination. In this section, I derive the equilibrium value of such forecasts and show that p l(t) and p 2(t) are also sufficient statistics to make this quantitative determination. Along the lines of the analysis in Section II, I derive the equilibrium value by showing a correspondence between the returns from a portfolio managed by the market timer and the returns from certain option investment strategies.
As in Section II, the market timer manages an investment company or mutual fund which invests in the market and riskless bonds according to the following strategy: At date t, if his forecast is that bonds will outperform stocks-that is, y(t) = 0-then he will allocate 100 'rl(t)% of the fund's assets to the market and 100 [1 -'rl(t)]% of the fund's assets to bonds. If his forecast is that stocks will out perform bonds-that is, y(t) = 1-then he will allocate 100 -r2(t)% to the market and 100 [1 -2(t)]% to bonds. It is assumed that the distribution of his forecasts satisfies (20) and that these conditional probabilities along with 7)l(t) and 2(t) are made known to outside investors. It is further assumed that the market timer's forecasts are rational, that is, p l(t) + p 2(t) : 1, and that he acts rationally on his forecasts, that is, 'r)2(t) > 7)l(t). As in the previous section, investors have different information sets and hence can have heterogeneous probability beliefs about the return on the market.
As before, 0(t) is a random variable such that 0(t) = 1 if the forecast is correct and 0(t) = 0 if the forecast is wrong. Along the lines of (5) of Section II, the return per dollar on the assets of the fund, X(t), can be written as
X(t) = [N2(t) -(t) -0(t)(t)][ZM(t) -R(t)] + R(t) for 0 < ZM(t) -R(t) -[l(t) + 0(t)A(t)][Zm(t) -R(t)] + R(t) (26) for R(t) < Zm(t) < oo, where A(t)=--2(t) -7l(t) > 0 and the conditional distribution for 0(t)
is given by (20). From (26), the return per dollar to an investor in the fund, Zp(t), can be written as
where m(t) is the management fee expressed as a fraction of assets held by the fund. As in Section II, I assume for convenience that one share of the market portfolio has a current price of $1 and, as before, let g (t) denote the price of a one-(forecast) period put option on one share of the market porfolio with an exercise price of R(t).
I begin my analysis by constructing a specific options-investment portfolio whose returns will be compared with those of the market timer's fund. The specific portfolio strategy is as follows: For each dollar invested in the portfolio, allocate the fractions col(t) L-ql(t) +
p2(t) A(t)]/[1 + m(t)] to the market, co2(t) g(t)[p l(t) + p 2(t) -1] l(t)/1I + m(t)] to put options on the market, and 03(t)
-C1(t) -2(t) to riskless bonds. The return per dollar on this portfolio, Z8(t), can be written as
Z8(t) = oJ1(t)ZM(t) + O2(t){max [0,R(t) -ZM(t)]}/g(t) + cO3(t)R(t). (28)
Substituting for the portfolio weights, (28) can be rewritten as
ZS(t) = [{71(t) + [1 -pl(t)]A(t)}[ZM(t) -R(t)] + [1 + m(t) -X(t)A(t)XR(t)]/[l + m(t)] for 0 -ZM(t) -R(t) (29) -{Ll(t) + p2(t)A(t)][ZM(t) -R(t)] + [1 + m(t) -X(t)A(t)]R(t)}/[1 + m(t)] for R(t) < Zm(t) < oo, where X(t) g(t)[pl(t) + p2(t) -1].
If U(t) Zp(t) -Zs(t), then from (26), (27), and (29), we have that U(t) = {[pl(t) -0(t)] A(t)[Zm(t) -R(t)] + [X(t)tA(t) -m(t)IR(t)}I[1 + m(t)] for 0 -ZM(t) S R(t) (30) = {r8(t) -p2(t)] A(t)[ZM(t) -R(t)] + [X(t) A(t) -m(t)1R(t)}I[1 + m(t)]
for R(t) < ZM(t) < oo.
Define the expectation operator, Ej, such that for any random variable Y(t), Ej[Y(t)] means "the expected value of the random variable Y(t) based upon the information set 4j(t)." Conditional upon ZM(t) = Z, we have from (20) that investorj's conditional expectation of 0(t) can be written as Ej[0(t) I ZM(t) = Z] = p l(t) for 0 -Z -R(t) =P2(t) for R(t) < Z < x.
(31) Because p l(t) andp2(t) do not depend uponj, we have from (31) that all investors agree on the conditional expectation of 0(t).
It follows from (30) and (31) that for investor j, the conditional expectation of U(t) will satisfy
Ej[U(t) JZM(t) = Z] = [X(t)A(t) -m(t)IR(t)/[l + m(t)]
-a(t)
for all Z. Because X(t), A(t), m(t), and R(t) do not depend uponj, it follows that all investors agree on the conditional expectation of U(t).
From (32), the unconditional expectation of U(t) from the viewpoint of investorj can be written as Ej[U(t)] L Ej[U(t) I ZM(t) = ZM(t) = Z]fj(Z,t)dZ (33)
= |xa(t)fj(Z,t)dZ.
Because X(t), A(t), R(t), and m(t) do not depend on Z, a(t) does not depend upon Z, and we have from (33) that Ej[U(t)] = Ej[U(t) I Zm(t) = Z]
= a(t)
independent of the information set fj. Therefore, all investors agree that the expected value of U(t), conditional on the return on the market, is equal to its unconditional expected value and that this common value is a(t).
Because all investors agree on a(t), we can unambiguously define the random variable E(t) U(t) -a(t). From (30) and (34), E(t) can be expressed as e(t) = [pl(t) -0()]A()[Zm{t) -R(t)]I[l + m(t)] for 0 -ZM(t) -R(t) = [0(t) -p2(t)] A(t)[ZM(t) -R(t)]/[l + m(t)]
for R(t) < ZM(t) < oo. In summary, we have that
(Note that for ZM[t] = R[t], E
. , N, (A) Ej[E(t)] = 0; (B)Ej[E(t) I ZM(t) = Z] = 0 for all Z; (C) E[E(t) I Z(t) = Z] = 0 for all Z; (D) E(t) is uncorrelated with both ZM(t) and Z,(t).
From (34), Ej[U(t)] = a(t), j = 1, . . ., N. E(t) U(t) -a(t), and therefore, Ej[E(t)]
Zp(t) = Z8(t) + a(t) + E(t)
where all investors agree on the value of a(t) and on the properties of E(t) given in proposition IV.1. In the terminology of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970), E(t) is "noise" relative to the portfolio return Z,(t). Hence, the stochastic component of the return on the market timer's fund is equal to the stochastic component of ZS(t) plus noise where, by inspection of (35), the source of this noise is the error in the market timer's forecast. Indeed if, as in Section II, the market timer were a perfect forecaster, then pQ(t) = p2(t) = 0(t) = 1, and E(t) 0.
In the case when the market timer is a perfect forecaster, the equilibrium management fee can be determined immediately from (36) with no further assumptions. Because E(t) 0, a(t) must equal zero. Otherwise, the market timer's fund will either dominate or be dominated by the portfolio with return Zs(t), which would violate a necessary condition for equilibrium. Therefore, from (32), the equilibrium management fee must satisfy m(t) = X(t) (t). Depending upon the leverage position A(t) adopted by the fund, this formula corresponds exactly to the ones given by (7), proposition 11.5, and proposition 11.6 in Section II.
Unfortunately, for imperfect forecasting-that is, E(t) A 0- (36) alone is not sufficient to determine the equilibrium fee. However, we can derive the equilibrium fee for the case where all the risk associated with E(t) is diversifiable or nonsystematic risk. This case is particularly relevant because we have assumed throughout the paper that the trades made by the market timer for the fund do not affect market prices. For such information trades to have a negligible effect on prices, the value of securities held by the fund would have to be a very small fraction of the total value of all securities outstanding. However, it will be shown that under this condition, virtually all the risk associated with E(t) will be diversifiable. Thus, the equilibrium fee derived under the assumption that all the risk of E(t) is diversifiable will be a close approximation to the "true" equilibrium management fee. In the well-known Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin Capital Asset Pricing Model, the nondiversifiable or systematic risk of a security is measured by its "beta." Suppose that there are n risky securities in addition to the riskless security and let Xi(t) denote the return per dollar on security i between t and t + 1, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Then, the beta of security i relative to information set 4j is given by As is well known, rather specific assumptions about either investors' preferences or the probability distributions of returns are required for the hypothesized conditions of proposition IV.2 to obtain, and for the same reasons, beta is a rather specialized measure of systematic risk. However, using a more general measure of systematic risk developed in Merton (in press), the conclusion of proposition IV.2 can be shown to obtain under much weaker hypothesized conditions. Let qjj(t) denote the set of efficient portfolios relative to information set +j(t) where a portfolio with return per dollar Ze(t) will be a member of qjj(t) if there exists an increasing, strictly concave function V whose first derivative satisfies Ej{V'[Z{,(t)][X(t) -R(t)]} = 0 for i = 1, . . ., n. Thus, qj(t) is the set of all feasible portfolios which might be chosen as an optimal portfolio by a risk-averse, expected-utility-maximizing investor who bases his decisions upon information set 4j(t). For any security or portfolio k with return Zk(t) and any portfolio contained in ifj(t) with return Ze(t), we define the systematic risk of security k relative to this efficient portfolio, Because the optimal portfolio of investorj is contained in qjj(t), it follows from proposition IV.3 that the equilibrium management fee will be given by m(t) = X(t) A\ ( In summary, if the E(t) component of the risk of the market timer's fund is completely diversifiable, then the management fee will equal X(t) z(t). The economic interpretation of this fee is very similar to the one presented in Section II for the perfect-forecasting case. If the risk of E(t) can be "diversified away," then the returns to the fund will be essentially the same as the returns from following the options investment strategy (28) which uses no forecast information. However, in the absence of a management fee, the market timer's fund achieves this pattern of returns without having to "pay" for the options. Therefore, the value of the market timer's forecast skills will equal the value of the options required to follow the options strategy with returns given by (28). To see that this is indeed the case when m(t) = X(t) I\(t), note that, as in (8) Therefore, for m(t) = X(t) I\(t), the management fee is just equal to the value of the put options. For the same leverage level, \(t), the number of "free" put options received is smaller for the imperfect forecaster than for the perfect forecaster because [p l(t) + P 2(t) -1] < 1. In the limiting case of no forecasting skills, p l(t) + p 2(t) = 1, and the number of "free" put options is zero as is the equilibrium management fee.
fjQ(t) covy [Xi(t),ZM(t)]/covj [ZM(t),ZM(t)],
X(tA(t) = [pl(t) + p2(t)-1]g(t)A(t).
From (36), covy [Zp(t), ZM(t)] = coVy [IZ(t), ZM(t)] + coVj [E(t), ZM(t)]. From proposition IV. 1, all investors agree that covj[E(t), ZM(t)]
Having established that m(t) = X(t)Al(t) when the risk associated with E(t) is diversifiable, we now show that this solution will be a good approximation to the exact equilibrium management fee provided that the value of securities held by the fund is a small fraction of the total value of all securities outstanding.
By inspection of (35), the sources of randomness in E(t) are the return on the market and forecast error by the market timer. In the proof of proposition IV. 1, it was already shown that Ej[E(t) I ZM ( Of course, a profit-maximizing market timer would never choose a management fee exactly equal to X(t)A(t) because at this maximum fee, Df(t) = 0 and he would receive zero revenues. Suppose, however, that in equilibrium, the value of securities held by the fund is very much smaller than aggregate wealth, W(t). Then, Df(t) << W(t). This case is empirically quite relevant because the market value of stocks and bonds in the United States is in excess of $1 trillion, and therefore, even for a large (e.g., $1 billion) fund, Df(t)IW(t) will be quite small. Although prosaic, a good reason for using X(t) A(t) as an approximation to the equilibrium management fee is the observed fact that even the largest of funds represents a small fraction of the total value of securities outstanding. However, further theoretical support for this approximation can be found in the case where there are many independent market timers offering their services to investors. As with other investments, it will be optimal for risk-averse investors to "diversify" and spread their holdings among all the market timers' funds. If the number of such funds is large, then this optimal behavior will lead to a relatively small aggregate demand for any one fund.
Suppose that there are Q market timers and that each provides information and behaves in a fashion similar to the market timer described throughout this paper. Let the subscript q applied to otherwise previously defined variables denote that variable for market timer q, q For proposition IV.6 not to be vacuous, it is essential that a significant number of market timers have some forecasting skills. Otherwise, if only a few have such skills, then p lq(t) + p 2q(t) = 1 for virtually all market timers, and trivially, as Q --oo, mq(t) = 0 = Xq(t)Aq(t) for all but possibly a finite number of market timers. If the Efficient Markets Hypothesis held exactly, then mq(t) = 0 = Xq(t) Aq(t) for all q, and it would be optimal for investors not to invest in any of the funds. On the other hand, if there is even a very small chance that any given market timer q has some forecasting skill, then [p lq(t) + p 2JI) -1] will be positive, albeit small, and it will be optimal for every investor to put a small fraction of his wealth in each fund.
The fact that Q is "large" in the sense of proposition IV.6 does not mean that all members of the population or even all investors must engage in market-forecasting activities. That is, Q >> I is consistent with QIN << 1. For example, Q = 10,000 is quite a large number for the purpose of applying the asymptotic conclusions of proposition IV.6 as a good approximation. For the U.S. population 220 million, this would require that only one person in 22,000 be engaged in market forecasting. There are approximately 17 million investors who hold individual stocks in the United States. Hence, for Q to equal 10,000, only one in 1,700 of these active investors need be a market timer. Therefore, market forecasting can be a relatively rare occupation, and yet, the hypothesized conditions of proposition IV.6 could be essentially satisfied.
Independence of the forecast errors among market timers is essential for proposition IV.6 to obtain. Indeed, if all funds were managed using the same information set, then [Eq(t)] would be perfectly dependent, and as will be shown later in proposition IV.7, the number of funds available will have no effect upon the equilibrium management fees. However, even if there are "families" of market timers where forecasts among members of each family are not independent, proposition IV.6 will still obtain provided there are a large number of independent families. Proposition IV.6 provides essentially a "demand" reason why the equilibrium size of the market timer's fund would be relatively small. The cost function of the market timer provides a "supply" reason. If beyond some size marginal costs increase, there will be an optimal size for the fund. If this optimal size is small relative to the value of all securities outstanding, then the equilibrium management fee can be approximated by X(t) A(t). The manifest costs of operating the fund, such as salaries, information gathering and processing, bookkeeping, etc., are not likely to produce increasing marginal costs. However, there are other, latent costs associated with size that could cause the marginal cost function to be increasing. As more employees are required to handle an increase in the size of the fund, the risk increases that the proprietary knowledge used by the market timer will be "leaked" to either competitors or the public generally. Such leaks would diminish or even eliminate the rents that the market timer can earn from this knowledge. Even if such direct leaks could be prevented, for a large enough size, the transactions made by the fund will affect market prices. If A(t) is the amount of assets under management, then every change requires a trade of $A(t) A(t) in the market portfolio and $A(t)A(t) in the riskless security. Thus, as A(t) gets larger, the market timer must either reduce his response (per unit of assets) to a change in view, A(t), or pay a higher "spread." Either action will diminish the performance of the fund and therefore reduce the management fee that investors will be willing to pay for his services. In a business whose whole value comes from proprietary knowledge which cannot be protected by patients, it is not unreasonable that these latent costs could be significant enough to induce an optimal fund size which is small relative to the value of all securities.
Of course, to determine the optimal fund size and the associated exact equilibrium structure of management fees would require an analysis of the optimal behavior of the market timer. If the objective of the market timer is to maximize the total profits that he receives for his forecasting skills, then to achieve this objective, he can choose both the management fee rate, m(t), and the investment or leverage policy of the fund, ?k(t). He can also choose to have more than one fund, with a different rate and policy for each fund. In general, the optimal fund size and management fee will depend upon the cost function and the structure of investors' demand functions for the fund, which in turn depend upon their preferences, endowments, and probability assessments for the returns on all available securities. However, as we now show, neither the leverage chosen for the fund, A(t), nor the number of funds made available, K, will affect the total revenues received by the market timer. PROPOSITION 
and A(t) = Ai(t), ai(t) = [X(t)Ai(t) mi*(t)]R(t)I[I + m*(t)], and 4(t) [p l(t) -0(t)][Zm(t) -R(t)] for 0 S Zm(t) S R(t) and [0(t) -p 2(t)][Zm(t) -R(t)] for Zm(t) > R(t). Note that the random variable 4(t) does not depend upon either m (t) or Ai(t) and
Substituting for ik, we can rewrite this expression as Yik(t) = Yi(t) + I[oikak(t) -ai(t)]. By inspection, if )oikak(t)
> ai(t), then Yik(t) > Yi(t) for every possible outcome, and every investor would be better off to invest in fund k in the alternative strategy than to invest in fund i. Therefore, to avoid fund i being dominated by fund k, Coikak(t) ai (t). Of course, to avoid fund k being dominated by fund i, cOkiai(t) 6 a,k(t). Noting that (0ik = l/(oki, we have that for neither fund to be dominated by the other, COikak(t) = ai(t). Consider a set of optimal management fees {mi(t)} that support an equilibrium allocation where an aggregate of $Ii(t)(-0) is invested in fund i, i = 1, . .. , K. For COikak(t) = ai(t), Yik(t) = Yi(t), and therefore all investors would be indifferent between investing $I in fund i or investing $IcOik in fund k and using the alternative strategy. Thus, the same set of optimal management fees that support the equilibrium in the market portfolio and the same amount in the riskless security where Ai(t) is the value of assets under management in fund i. In the proof of part (ii) of proposition IV.7, it was shown that investors would be indifferent between the allocations [Ii(t)] and [Ii(t)] among the market timer's K funds. We now show that the size of total transactions in response to the market timer's forecast will be the same under either allocation.
From the definition of
If Ii(t) is the gross investment in fund i, then after taking out man- Therefore, the size of total transactions under either allocation is the same. It follows that neither the leverage chosen for the fund nor the number of funds made available will affect the market timer's transaction costs from spreads. Hence, from this result and proposition IV.7, the total profits earned by the market timer will be invariant to either the number of funds he manages or the leverage policies of the funds. In contrast to the Jensen model (1972a, sec. 4), we have from proposition IV.7 that, from the investor viewpoint, there is no "optimal" or "preferred" policy [?)l(t), ?)2(t)]. All that is required here is that investors know what the policy is and that 'r2(t)> >rj1(t). While the maximum management fee, X(t)A(t), will only provide a reasonable approximation to the true equilibrium fee if investment in the fund is a small fraction of total investment, the proof of proposition IV.7 required no such assumption. Therefore, the conclusions of this proposition are valid, independent of the size of the fund. Hence, to analyze the optimal behavior of a market timer and determine the equilibrium value of his information, one can assume without loss of generality that the market timer exploits his information by managing a single fund and that the leverage policy of the fund is A(t) = 1. I close this study with a brief example which suggests that other than in the (approximately) incipient case stressed here, it will not be appropriate to assume that transactions made by the market timer will have a negligible effect on market prices. Therefore, to properly analyze the optimal behavior of a market timer and the associated equilibrium structure of management fees for the nonincipient case, one must develop a significantly more complex model where the market timer and investors in making their optimal decisions take into account the effect of the fund's size on the perfornance of the fund. Needless to say, no such attempt will be made here.
For purposes of the example, we assume that investors are riskaverse, mean-variance utility maximizers with homogeneous probability assessments. It is also assumed that the distribution of the market timer's forecast error is independent of the return on the market, that is, p l(t) = p 2(t) = p (t). If it is assumed that the fund's transactions have no effect on market prices, then from a standard mean-variance portfolio analysis, the equilibrium aggregate demand for the fund will satisfy
Df (t)IDM(t) = a (t)oi(t)I{[ZM(t) -R(t)] var [e(t)]}
where DM(t) is the equilibrium aggregate demand for (nonfund) investment in the market, ZM(t) and oj2(t) are, respectively, the agreed-upon expected value and variance of the return per dollar on the market portfolio. From (35), we have forp l(t) = p2(t) = p(t) and A(t) = 1 that
var [E(t)] = p(t)[l -p(t)]oj1(t)/[1 + m(t)]2. (42)
Hence, from (32) and (42), (41) can be rewritten as
Df(t)IDM(t) = [(2p(t) -1)g(t) -m(t)][l + m(t)IR(t)I { p (t)[l -p (t)][ZM(t) -R(t)]}. (43)
If the market timer has no variable costs,22 then he will choose the management fee which maximizes his total revenues, m(t)Df ( 
Hence, from (44), (43) can be rewritten as
Df(t)IDM(t) = X(t)[2 + X(t)]R(t)I{4p(t)[1 -p(t)][Zm(t) -R(t)]}. (45)
By inspection, the equilibrium demand starts at zero when p (t) = .5 and the market timer has no forecasting skills and is a strictly increas-22. Of course, we have neglected throughout our analysis those operating costs common to all investment companies including "passively managed" or "noinformation" funds. So, the derived management fee is an "incremental" fee for forecasting skills. The "variable costs" referred to here are the additional trading costs associated with "actively managed" funds. 
where v(t) =p(t) -0.5. Hence, for a market timer with an annual forecasting edge of p (t) = 0.51, the equilibrium demand for his fund would be approximately 4% of all other risky asset holdings. And for each percentage point increase in his probability of a correct forecast, the equilibrium demand will increase by fourfold. So, at p(t) = 0.55, the fund will represent more than 20% of all other risky assets. Of course, the demand would be even larger if the market timer's forecasting interval were less than 1 year. Noting that the assumed investment strategy for the fund requires trades of the order of Df(t), it is simply unrealistic to assume that tranasactions of the size implied by (46) will not affect market prices. We have, of course, only shown this to be the case in a specific example. However, there is nothing especially pathological about the example. Hence, to properly determine the optimal fund size for a market timer with virtually any forecasting skill at all, one should explicitly take into account the trading or "spread" costs associated with the size of the fund.
In summary, it has been shown that, up to an additive noise term, the pattern of returns from an investment strategy based upon market timing will be the same as the pattern of returns from a "partial protective put" option investment strategy. If this noise term which is caused by forecast error is diversifiable, then, independent of investors' preferences, endowments, or probability beliefs, the equilibrium management fee is given by m(t) = X(t)A(t)
[p(t) + p2(t) -1] g(t)Lrj2(t) --r(t)]. Because the equilibrium management fee is proportional to the price of a put option on the market portfolio, the comparative statics analysis of the equilibrium management fee presented in Section II for the perfect-forecasting case carries over to the imperfect-forecasting case presented here. Finally, in the empirically relevant case where the size of the market timer's fund represents a small fraction of the total value of all securities, X(t)A(t) will provide a close approximation to the exact equilibrium management fee.
